no toast or invite to portal - #272
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…H-49, GH-52, GH-75, GH-102, GH-272) (#3573) * fix(api): derive soa organizationId from session, not request body Every SOA handler now overwrites dto.organizationId with the trusted @organizationId() session value before calling the service, closing the cross-tenant read/tamper/destroy gap in save-answer, auto-fill, create-document, ensure-setup, approve, decline, and submit-for-approval. Refs GH-36 * fix(api): scope task automations to task and organization automationId lookups are now verified against the task in the URL and the caller's organization via a shared verifyAutomationAccess helper, so an automationId from another org's task 404s on read, update, delete, runs, versions, and publish instead of leaking or mutating it. Refs GH-46 * fix(api): harden public trust-portal access endpoints reclaimAccess no longer returns the access link/token in the response body and returns an identical generic message whether or not a grant exists, removing the unauthenticated token disclosure and the email-enumeration oracle; the link is only emailed to the requester. findPublishedTrustByRouteId no longer auto-creates a published Trust row or flips drafts to published: public endpoints only resolve rows that are already published and 404 otherwise, so an unauthenticated caller can no longer force-publish an organization's trust portal. Refs GH-42, GH-272 * fix(app): require session and org match in task-automation actions Every exported server action now resolves the caller's session and active organization and fails closed when unauthenticated. Actions that take orgId must match the session's active org; S3 keys must be prefixed with the active org; automationId-only actions verify ownership through the automation's task before proxying to the enterprise API. Refs GH-52 * fix(app): require auth and run ownership before minting trigger tokens healAndSetAccessToken and createAccessToken now require a session with an active organization and only mint a Trigger.dev run-read token when the run id is recorded against that organization (onboarding job, knowledge base document, or remediation batch). Refs GH-102 * ci(device-agent): restrict release workflow to protected branches The device-agent release pipeline runs branch-controlled build scripts with Apple and SSL.com code-signing secrets in scope, so push triggers are now limited to main and release (manual staging builds remain via workflow_dispatch), and the secret-bearing jobs are gated behind the staging/production GitHub environments. Refs GH-49, GH-75
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