fix: restrict workos doctor credential base URL to trusted hosts

[devin-ai-integration]

Summary

Automated first-pass security fix for SEC-1364 — requires human security review before merge.

workos doctor resolves the WorkOS API key from the developer's own secrets (shell env or .env.local) but resolves the API base URL from the project's .env/.env.local — a file an attacker can commit to any repo. It then sent the key as Authorization: Bearer to that URL with no host validation, no HTTPS enforcement, and no consent prompt. A developer running this "read-only" diagnostic inside a poisoned clone leaks their staging/sandbox key (full admin of that WorkOS environment) to an attacker host. Confirmed by reproduction: the key was captured verbatim by an attacker-controlled host, and skipped only for sk_live_ keys / --skip-api.

The fix gates the credentialed call (checkDashboardSettings → fetchDashboardSettings in src/doctor/checks/dashboard.ts) behind a host allowlist so the key is only ever sent to trusted WorkOS hosts:

export function isCredentialSafeBaseUrl(baseUrl: string): boolean {
  const url = tryParse(baseUrl);                 // unparsable -> false
  const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();
  if (host === 'localhost' || '127.0.0.1' || '::1') return true;  // internal dev, any scheme
  if (url.protocol !== 'https:') return false;   // remote must be HTTPS
  return host === 'workos.com' || host.endsWith('.workos.com');
}

An untrusted WORKOS_BASE_URL now short-circuits with Skipped (untrusted WORKOS_BASE_URL: <url>) in the report instead of attaching the credential. Host matching is on the parsed URL.hostname, so look-alikes like api.workos.com.attacker.example are rejected.

Scope / follow-ups (for the human reviewer)

• Scoped to the credential-carrying call, which is the SEC-1364 vulnerability. The unauthenticated connectivity probe (checkConnectivity → ${baseUrl}/health) still uses the resolved base URL and will hit an attacker host with no credential — a much lower-severity SSRF/telemetry leak left out of this minimal fix; consider gating it on the same allowlist.
• The finding also suggests source-origin tracking (warn when key and base URL come from different files) and an explicit consent prompt for non-default hosts. Not included here to keep the diff small; reasonable hardening follow-ups.

Testing

• New src/doctor/checks/dashboard.spec.ts: allowlist unit tests (default host, *.workos.com, localhost, look-alike/rejection, non-HTTPS, unparsable) + checkDashboardSettings does not call fetch for an attacker URL, proceeds for a trusted one, and still skips production keys.
• Local end-to-end repro: vulnerable build leaked the Bearer key to workos-diag.attacker.example; the fixed build produced 0 credential requests and surfaced the skip reason.
• pnpm tsc --noEmit, pnpm lint, pnpm format:check, and full pnpm test (1995 tests) pass.

Do not merge/approve without human security review.

Link to Devin session: https://app.devin.ai/sessions/a67b9b282a7040c6bacd3ac0437fb152

[devin-ai-integration]

Original prompt from Linear User

Please work on ticket "workos doctor exfiltrates the resolved WorkOS API key to an attacker-controlled base URL taken from the project's .env file" (SEC-1364)

@playbook:playbook-b588614117c7477a9b9729928385384f

[devin-ai-integration]

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[linear-code]

SEC-1364

[greptile-apps]

Greptile Summary

This PR prevents workos doctor from sending API credentials to unapproved destinations. The main changes are:

• Adds an HTTPS WorkOS hostname allowlist with local-development exceptions.
• Normalizes trailing DNS root-label dots for trusted WorkOS hosts.
• Skips credentialed dashboard requests when the base URL is not allowed.
• Adds tests for trusted hosts, look-alikes, invalid URLs, and guarded requests.

Confidence Score: 5/5

This looks safe to merge.

• The trusted trailing-dot hostname now passes after normalization.
• Look-alike domains remain outside the allowlist.
• No blocking issues were found in the updated code.

Important Files Changed

Filename	Overview
src/doctor/checks/dashboard.ts	Adds the credential destination guard and accepts trusted WorkOS FQDNs with a trailing root-label dot.
src/doctor/checks/dashboard.spec.ts	Tests hostname validation and verifies that rejected destinations receive no credentialed request.

_{Reviews (2): Last reviewed commit: "Normalize trailing-dot FQDN when checkin..." | Re-trigger Greptile}