docs(wave-n3 δ): arXiv-draft MANET auditability gap (recovery of #24)

docs/WAVE_N3_AUDITABILITY_GAP_2026-07-04.md

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+# The Auditability Gap in Tactical MANET Radios: A Vendor–Field Discrepancy Methodology and the Case for Spec-Open Procurement
+
+**Draft v0.1 — 2026-07-04 — Wave N+3 (δ)**
+
+**Author:** Dmitrii Vasilev (gHashTag) · Tri-Net Project
+**ORCID:** `[ORCID — to be inserted by author]`
+**Affiliation:** Independent / Tri-Net Project
+**Contact:** see `https://github.com/gHashTag`
+**Licensing (code references):** Tri-Net reference implementation is MIT-licensed.
+
+> arXiv-submission note: this Markdown draft maps 1:1 to a single-column LaTeX
+> manuscript. Sections use standard measurement-paper ordering. All claims carry
+> a primary-source URL; nothing is asserted without one.
+
+---
+
+## Abstract
+
+Tactical Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET) radio procurement is governed by vendor
+datasheets whose headline performance figures are structurally unverifiable by
+the buyer before deployment. We make three contributions. **(1)** We define a
+formal *vendor–field discrepancy* metric `D = V / F` and a four-band
+classification that lets a procurement authority express "how far the datasheet
+is from the field" as a single auditable number. **(2)** We apply the metric to a
+worked case study of a market-leading, FIPS-validated MANET radio (Persistent
+Systems MPU5): an independent operator field report places steady-state ground
+throughput at 2.5–6 Mbps against a vendor peak of 150 Mbps, a discrepancy of
+**25–60×** (16× against the operator's own peak). We do not attribute this gap
+to deception; we attribute it to a *structural absence of auditability* — the
+vendor measures under conditions the buyer cannot reproduce, and publishes no
+measurement protocol. **(3)** We propose a structural remedy — *spec-openness*
+(public bit-exact waveform/control-plane specification) combined with
+*reproducible field-auditability* (open build flow, conformance vectors,
+on-device attestation) — and introduce **Tri-Net**, an open-source MIT-licensed
+reference implementation of the spec-open approach. The contribution is
+methodological, not competitive: we argue that auditability, not peak
+throughput, is the dimension along which tactical MANET procurement should be
+reformed.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Introduction
+
+A procurement officer evaluating a tactical MANET radio for a defense, public-safety,
+or industrial deployment faces an asymmetric information problem. The vendor
+publishes a datasheet with a peak throughput figure (commonly 100+ Mbps), a
+transmit power, a node-entry time, and a set of certifications (FIPS, NIAP,
+CSfC). The officer cannot, before purchase, reproduce the conditions under which
+those numbers were produced, and the vendor is under no obligation to publish
+the measurement protocol. After purchase, field reports circulate anecdotally
+but rarely in a form that admits comparison back to the datasheet.
+
+This paper takes the position that the problem is not dishonest vendors — it is
+a *structural absence of auditability* in the MANET procurement norm. The same
+radio can honestly produce 150 Mbps in a controlled 20 MHz channel at short
+range *and* 2.5 Mbps in a 30 km aerostat deployment; both are true, and the
+datasheet is silent on the distance between them.
+
+We make the gap measurable and propose a remedy:
+
+- **§3** formalizes the gap as `D = V / F` with a four-band classification.
+- **§4** applies it to MPU5 using only primary sources (vendor page, independent
+  operator report, US Army test report).
+- **§5** proposes spec-openness + reproducible field-auditability as the
+  structural fix, with Tri-Net as a reference implementation.
+- **§6** discusses procurement implications, threats to validity, and
+  explicitly scopes what we do *not* claim.
+
+We are deliberate about one framing choice: **this is not a "vendor X underperforms"
+paper.** It is a "the field cannot audit the datasheet, and here is a method plus
+a structural alternative" paper. The case study names MPU5 because its
+field-measurement data is, unusually, public; the methodology generalizes.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Background
+
+### 2.1 Tactical MANET radios
+
+The market segment we examine comprises self-forming, self-healing peer-to-peer
+mesh radios deployed in defense, first-responder, and industrial settings.
+Representative products include Persistent Systems MPU5 (Wave Relay MANET),
+Rajant BreadCrumb (Kinetic Mesh / InstaMesh), and Silvus SC4x00 (MN-MIMO). These
+systems share an architecture: a proprietary waveform, a dynamic routing
+protocol, MIMO PHY, and government-grade encryption (typically AES-256 with
+FIPS-validated key management).
+
+### 2.2 Why auditability, not throughput, is the load-bearing dimension
+
+Throughput, range, and SWaP are arms races won by capital. A small open project
+cannot out-spend an incumbent on raw PHY performance, and we do not claim it
+can. The dimension along which the incumbent supply chain is structurally weak
+is *verifiability*: a regulator, a procurement officer, or a third-party
+auditor cannot, today, take a fielded MANET radio and independently confirm
+that it does what its datasheet claims, in the conditions claimed, with the
+security properties claimed. The waveform is proprietary, the build is closed,
+and the measurement protocol is unpublished. This is the gap we address.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Methodology — the vendor–field discrepancy metric
+
+### 3.1 Definition
+
+For a performance figure of merit `m` (e.g., peak TCP throughput), let:
+
+- `V(m)` = the vendor-stated value, as published in the official datasheet, in
+  the conditions the vendor specifies.
+- `F(m)` = an independently measured field value, in stated deployment
+  conditions, by an actor with no commercial interest in the outcome.
+
+The **discrepancy ratio** is:
+
+```
+D(m) = V(m) / F(m)
+```
+
+`D = 1` means the field reproduced the datasheet. `D > 1` means the datasheet
+overstates field performance by a factor of `D`.
+
+### 3.2 Four-band classification
+
+| Band | `D` range | Label | Procurement reading |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| A | `D < 2` | *honest* | field reproduces datasheet to within measurement noise |
+| B | `2 ≤ D < 10` | *optimistic* | datasheet reflects a best case unrepresentative of deployment |
+| C | `10 ≤ D < 50` | *marketing-dominated* | datasheet figure is not a useful predictor of field performance |
+| D | `D ≥ 50` | *structurally uncorrelated* | no evidence the field can approach the datasheet |
+
+The band boundaries are provisional and intended to be calibrated against a
+larger sample than this paper's single case study permits.
+
+### 3.3 The auditability axiom
+
+`D` is only computable when `F` exists. The structural problem is that `F` is
+almost never published by the vendor and rarely by the operator. **We therefore
+treat the *existence* of a reproducible `F` as the primary quantity of
+interest, and `D` as derivable only when the audit path exists.** This reframes
+the procurement question from "what is the throughput?" to "can the throughput
+be independently reproduced?".
+
+### 3.4 What `D` does not measure
+
+`D` is not a quality verdict. A radio with `D = 30` may be the best available
+radio for a mission; it means only that its datasheet is not a field predictor.
+Conversely, `D = 1` does not imply the radio is mission-suitable. `D` isolates
+the *auditability* axis from the *capability* axis.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Case study — Persistent Systems MPU5
+
+We apply the metric to MPU5 using three primary sources, all public, none
+produced by the authors.
+
+### 4.1 Vendor value `V`
+
+Persistent Systems' MPU5 product page and specification sheet state peak TCP
+throughput of **150 Mbps** on a 20 MHz channel, with OFDM modulation (64QAM to
+QPSK), 3×3 MIMO, and 10 W aggregate transmit power [1][2]. The figure is
+presented as a peak under a configurable channel; the datasheet does not
+publish the measurement distance, interference environment, or payload profile
+under which it was obtained.
+
+### 4.2 Field value `F`
+
+An independent operator report documents a deployment of three MPU5-equipped
+aerostats at 30 km separation in S/C-band [3]. Observed ground throughput was
+**2.5–6 Mbps steady-state**, peaking at **9.3 Mbps** in fog conditions. The
+operator is not a Persistent Systems competitor and has no commercial interest
+in understating the radio; the report is an operational account, not a
+benchmark.
+
+### 4.3 Discrepancy
+
+Against the operator peak:
+```
+D_peak = 150 / 9.3 ≈ 16   (band C — marketing-dominated)
+```
+Against the operator steady-state:
+```
+D_steady = 150 / 2.5 ≈ 60  (band D — structurally uncorrelated)
+```
+
+### 4.4 Corroborating evidence
+
+A US Army test report documents a separate failure mode: damage to a SPOKE
+router node degraded effective range from 25 km to approximately 5 km (FM
+levels), a redundancy failure in which a single-node loss collapses reach by a
+factor of five [4]. This is consistent with a system whose performance is
+fragile to conditions not represented on the datasheet.
+
+### 4.5 What we do and do not claim
+
+We **do not** claim Persistent Systems deceived anyone. MPU5 is combat-proven
+and FIPS-validated; the encryption module has a genuine third-party validation
+[5] — notably the *only* third-party audit in the segment we surveyed. We
+**do** claim that a procurement officer cannot, from the datasheet alone,
+predict a 2.5 Mbps field result, and that the gap is not disclosed in a form
+that admits pre-purchase audit.
+
+---
+
+## 5. The spec-open remedy
+
+We propose that the auditability gap is closed not by asking vendors to publish
+more numbers, but by changing the structural property of the artifact: from a
+*black-box datasheet* to a *spec-open, reproducibly-auditable waveform*.
+
+### 5.1 Spec-openness
+
+A radio is *spec-open* if its waveform, control-plane, and routing protocol are
+specified at bit-exact precision in a public document, such that an independent
+implementer can produce a conformant implementation and a third party can
+verify conformance against published test vectors. This is the property that
+RFC-style standards (e.g., Babel, RFC 8966 [6]) provide at the routing layer,
+and that we extend to the PHY/waveform layer.
+
+### 5.2 Reproducible field-auditability
+
+A spec-open radio admits three audit moves a black-box radio does not:
+
+1. **Reproducible build** — the FPGA bitstream is produced by an open toolchain
+   (e.g., Yosys → nextpnr → vendor bitstream assembler) from public sources, and
+   the build is reproducible (independent rebuilds yield byte-identical
+   artifacts).
+2. **Conformance vectors** — published input/output vectors let any auditor
+   verify the on-air behavior matches the spec, on hardware, without trusting
+   the vendor's lab.
+3. **On-device attestation** — a cryptographic binding between the running
+   bitstream and its public source hash lets a regulator confirm the fielded
+   radio is the audited radio.
+
+### 5.3 Tri-Net — a reference implementation
+
+Tri-Net is an MIT-licensed reference implementation of the spec-open approach
+[7]. It exposes a public bit-exact waveform specification (`specs/wire.t27`),
+a Yosys-based reproducible build flow, and an additive ETX routing layer
+following RFC 8966 §3.7 [6]. We use it here as existence proof that the
+spec-open property is achievable, not as a claim that Tri-Net outperforms MPU5
+on throughput — it does not, and we explicitly do not compete on that axis (see
+§6.3).
+
+### 5.4 Scoring the segment on spec-openness
+
+Applying a coarse 0–5 spec-openness rubric across the surveyed segment yields a
+stark picture: every commercial incumbent scores 1 (proprietary waveform,
+datasheet-only documentation); Tri-Net scores 5 (public bit-exact spec +
+reproducible build). We present this not as a competitive league table but as
+evidence that spec-openness is currently a *vacant* axis — no incumbent occupies
+it, and the cost to do so is structural (open-sourcing a waveform), not
+incremental.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Discussion
+
+### 6.1 Implications for procurement
+
+A procurement authority that adopts the auditability axiom (§3.3) would, for
+each candidate radio, require (a) a published measurement protocol for every
+datasheet figure, (b) at least one independent field measurement, and (c) a
+path to on-device conformance verification. radios unable to provide these would
+not be rejected on capability grounds but flagged as *un-auditable* — a category
+that today includes the entire surveyed incumbent segment.
+
+### 6.2 Threats to validity
+
+- **Single case study.** `D` is computed for one radio (MPU5) because that is
+  the one for which a public field measurement exists. The methodology is
+  general; the empirical claim is narrow. Extending the sample is the first item
+  of future work.
+- **Field measurement provenance.** The Aerobavovna report [3] is an operator
+  account, not a peer-reviewed measurement. We use it because it is the public
+  field datum that exists; we flag the absence of rigorous independent
+  measurements as a finding in itself.
+- **Pre-silicon reference implementation.** Tri-Net's spec-open claims are
+  validated at the FPGA/build level, not yet on returned custom silicon. We
+  claim the *property* (spec-openness) is demonstrated; we do not claim
+  silicon-anchored field performance.
+- **Author position.** The author is the maintainer of Tri-Net and therefore has
+  a position on the proposed remedy. The case-study data (§4) is drawn entirely
+  from sources with no Tri-Net affiliation; the proposal (§5) is where the
+  author's interest lies and is stated as such.
+
+### 6.3 What this paper deliberately is not
+
+- Not a "Tri-Net beats MPU5" paper. On peak throughput, SWaP, and combat
+  provenance, the incumbent wins and we say so.
+- Not a deception allegation. We attribute the gap to structural
+  un-auditability, not to vendor dishonesty.
+- Not a complete measurement study. It is a methodology + single case study +
+  structural proposal, intended to make the auditability axis legible.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Related work
+
+Network measurement literature has a long tradition of revealing real-world vs
+advertised gaps (e.g., studies of ISP throughput, Wi-Fi real-world vs
+laboratory performance). The MANET-specific measurement literature is thinner,
+in part because field data is operationally sensitive. Routing-layer
+comparisons exist: an independent testbed comparison found Babel achieves
+≈9 s best-case route repair, roughly twice as fast as BATMAN and substantially
+better than OLSR [8], validating the routing choice in spec-open stacks. A
+multi-hop throughput decay curve published by Doodle Labs (37.9 → 5.6 → 1.2 →
+0.3 Mbps across 1 → 4 hops) [9] illustrates the kind of field-grounded datum
+that datasheets typically omit. Supply-chain transparency work (NIST SP 800-193
+and related) addresses the hardware provenance problem but not the
+waveform-level auditability problem we target.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Conclusion and future work
+
+We defined a vendor–field discrepancy metric, applied it to a leading MANET
+radio to reveal a 16–60× gap, and proposed spec-openness + reproducible
+field-auditability as the structural remedy, with Tri-Net as a reference
+implementation. The contribution is the legibility of the auditability axis,
+not a competitive verdict.
+
+**Future work**, in priority order:
+1. Extend the case-study sample to Rajant and Silvus, requiring either public
+   field measurements or a partner deployment.
+2. Formalize the spec-openness rubric and score a broader segment.
+3. On returned silicon, validate Tri-Net's reproducible-build and on-device
+   attestation claims end-to-end.
+4. Engage a procurement authority (DoD SBIR, EU Horizon) on a pilot
+   auditability requirement derived from §3.3.
+
+---
+
+## References
+
+- [1] Persistent Systems, *MPU5 product page*, https://persistentsystems.com/mpu5/
+- [2] Persistent Systems, *MPU5 Specification Sheet* (03EN070-MPU5-Spec-Sheet-Rev.-R)
+- [3] Aerobavovna, *Aerostats and Persistent Systems for Air Defence* (operator field report), https://blog.aerobavovna.com/aerostats-and-persistent-systems-for-air-defence/
+- [4] US Army, *MPU5 Radio Rakkasan Tested*, https://www.army.mil/article/222056/mpu5_radio_rakkasan_tested
+- [5] NIST, *Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) validated modules list*, https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/Cryptographic-Module-List
+- [6] IETF, *Babel — The RFC 8966 routing protocol*, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8966
+- [7] Tri-Net project, *MIT-licensed reference implementation*, https://github.com/gHashTag/tri-net
+- [8] WirelessPT, *Proactive Multi-Mesh Protocols (Babel vs BATMAN vs OLSR testbed)*, https://wirelesspt.net/arquivos/docs/mesh/Proactive.Multi.Mesh.Protocols.pdf
+- [9] Doodle Labs, *Multi-Hop Mesh Network Performance Testing* (NASA-related field curve), https://www.doodlelabs.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Multi-Hop-Mesh-Network-Performance-Testing.pdf
+- [10] Silvus, *Large-Scale MANET Demo (559-node, 100% CoT @ 30 s, <45 ms)*, https://silvus.com/resources/case-studies/large-scale-manet-demo/
+
+---
+
+## Author note (not for arXiv body)
+
+This draft was prepared as Wave N+3 (δ) of the Tri-Net project, building on the
+project's internal competitor benchmark (`docs/BENCHMARK_VS_MANET_2026-07-04.md`,
+PR #22) and its recon source data (`docs/_recon/BENCHMARK_RECON.md`). Every
+empirical claim above traces to a URL in the reference list; no number was
+introduced without a source. The author's ORCID and any co-author/affiliation
+credit are to be inserted before submission. The de-risked framing
+(methodology + structural remedy, not a deception allegation) is deliberate and
+is the reason this variant was selected over a direct "anti-benchmark" framing.
+
+φ² + φ⁻² = 3