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Authenticated Wesley Intent Admission Posture #482

Description

@flyingrobots

Migrated from Method backlog

This issue was created from a legacy filesystem backlog card. GitHub Issues are now the live work tracker; repository docs remain Method evidence.

Source backlog: docs/method/backlog/up-next/PLATFORM_authenticated-wesley-intent-admission-posture.md
Original lane: up-next
Original legend: PLATFORM

Original backlog card

Authenticated Wesley Intent Admission Posture

Status: proposed security hardening.

Depends on:

Why now

The toy contract proof showed that Wesley-generated helpers can produce
canonical EINT bytes and observation requests. That is a useful bridge, but it
is not a production admission boundary.

A Wesley intent should not become tick-admissible merely because its EINT bytes
parse. It must be tied to a verified contract artifact, a trustworthy footprint
authority, and an authenticated session or capability accepted by local policy.

What it should look like

Start RED-only.

Prove the current gap before implementation:

  • dispatch_intent(...) admits well-formed EINT without a contract artifact id.
  • dispatch_intent(...) admits well-formed EINT without session or capability
    proof.
  • Current ingress evidence cannot name artifact trust posture.
  • Current ingress evidence cannot name authenticated admission posture.
  • Current ingress evidence cannot bind replay protection.
  • Current reading rights posture cannot express policy-authorized observer
    sessions beyond KernelPublic.

Then introduce the smallest posture model that can represent:

  • registered Wesley contract artifact identity;
  • artifact trust posture;
  • authenticated intent submission identity;
  • policy/session admission result;
  • no caller-supplied footprint trust.

Acceptance criteria

  • A design or RED test names the current unauthenticated EINT admission gap.
  • The chosen model separates artifact trust from intent/session trust.
  • Artifact trust posture can represent local-dev, generated-test, CI, and later
    BLADE-certified ramps without treating them as equivalent.
  • Intent admission identity binds op id, canonical vars bytes, target
    coordinate, artifact id, session or policy id, and replay evidence.
  • The docs state that caller-supplied footprint claims are not trusted for tick
    scheduling or independence decisions.
  • The docs state that Holmes, WATSON, Moriarty, and BLADE are later
    certification providers, not dependencies of this first slice.
  • No production crypto is implemented before the posture and RED boundary are
    reviewed.

Non-goals

  • Do not implement WebAuthn, passkeys, TOTP, or transport encryption yet.
  • Do not implement Holmes, WATSON, Moriarty, or BLADE.
  • Do not add app-specific nouns to Echo core.
  • Do not import application Rust types into Echo core.
  • Do not replace EINT v1 without a specific RED.
  • Do not make dispatch_intent(...) read ambient host auth state.
  • Do not allow runtime-submitted footprint JSON to become a footprint authority.

Activity

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