fix(platform-wallet): commit wallet events off the async runtime - #4370
fix(platform-wallet): commit wallet events off the async runtime#4370romchornyi wants to merge 3 commits into
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`run_wallet_event_adapter` called `commit_batch` — and through it `persister.store()` — inline on the tokio worker driving it. `store()` is synchronous, and for the SQLite backend commits a real transaction per call; its own trait docs say so, and warn that a slow write blocks every other wallet accessor for its duration. What they do not say, because until now it was not true, is that it also blocks the runtime those accessors run on. Field evidence from a testnet restore of a 6663-transaction wallet: - drains coalesced into ever larger, ever rarer batches — folded 1 → 47 → 164 → 512, with gaps of 42s, 144s and finally 1109s between them; - the metrics tick covering the 512-event drain reported `busy_ratio=1106 mean_poll_us=1397886` — a 1.4s mean poll on a runtime that read 24µs one second later; - `Blocks: last_activity: 549s` at the same moment, so the SPV managers sharing that runtime were starved, not idle; - the durable watermark topped out at height 2179999 against a chain tip of 2520064 and never caught up, so the home timeline — which only advances when a batch lands — showed roughly a third of the history ten minutes after core sync reported 100%. The commit now runs on `spawn_blocking`. The handle is awaited rather than raced against `cancel`: a store that has started must finish, and dropping the handle would not stop the thread in any case — shutdown is observed at the next `recv`. `AdapterFaultState` and the freeze latch move behind an `Arc<Mutex<..>>` and an `Arc<AtomicBool>` rather than being moved into the closure by value. That is deliberate: if the commit thread ever panicked, moving them would lose a wallet's frozen watermark, which would un-freeze a wallet whose verification had failed — the one outcome the fail-closed guard exists to prevent. The lock is uncontended by construction (one drain commits at a time, and this task is the only writer). A panicking commit thread is now reported and the drain skipped, rather than taking the adapter down with it. cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib # 662 passed cargo clippy --all-targets + fmt # clean
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe adapter now persists folded batches through ChangesBatch persistence execution
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Mergeability Score: ⚪ Minimal · up to The change moves synchronous wallet-event commits off the async runtime while preserving commit behavior; no actionable merge-blocking risk remains beyond normal checks and review. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant AdapterLoop
participant BlockingCommit
participant ProbePersister
participant FaultState
AdapterLoop->>BlockingCommit: persist folded batch
BlockingCommit->>ProbePersister: call store
ProbePersister-->>BlockingCommit: return or panic
BlockingCommit-->>AdapterLoop: commit result or JoinError
AdapterLoop->>FaultState: fault unsettled wallets and freeze watermarks
AdapterLoop->>AdapterLoop: process later events
Possibly related PRs
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✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
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Inline comments:
In `@packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs`:
- Around line 409-420: Update the commit-task panic handling around the
committed match to capture all batch wallet IDs before moving batch into the
closure, then in the Err(join_error) branch lock fault and call fault_wallet()
for each captured ID before continuing. Preserve the existing error log and
ensure the normal Ok(diag) path remains unchanged.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
Moving synchronous persistence into spawn_blocking correctly prevents wallet commits from parking Tokio workers, but the new panic branch continues after consuming a batch whose persistence outcome is unknown, allowing a later watermark to advance past missing rows. The adapter must fail closed after a commit panic, and the off-runtime boundary should have deterministic regression coverage.
Source: reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol (Codex general and Rust-quality lanes); final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol (Codex). openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs:409-420: Continuing after a commit panic can advance the watermark past lost rows
`commit_batch` consumes the folded batch and calls `store()` for each wallet. If `store()` panics before its outcome is known, unwinding bypasses the `Err` arm that calls `fault_wallet`, drops the remainder of the consumed batch, and returns a `JoinError`. This branch then continues with an unaffected fault state, so a later event for the same wallet can successfully persist a higher `synced_height` even though rows from the panicked batch may be absent. That violates the adapter's fail-closed invariant; before this PR, the panic terminated the adapter and prevented later watermark advancement. Stop the adapter and latch `sync_fault`, or capture every batch wallet ID before moving the batch and fault all of them before continuing.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs:388-407: The off-runtime persistence boundary has no regression test
The existing `ProbePersister` returns immediately and checks only persistence outcomes. Those tests still pass if `commit_batch` is moved back inline onto the Tokio worker, so they do not protect the primary behavior introduced by this PR. Add a controllably blocking persister and run the adapter on a current-thread or single-worker runtime, then verify that another future makes progress while `store()` remains blocked. The fixture should also cover a panicking store and assert that no later store for the affected wallet carries `synced_height`.
| let diag = match committed { | ||
| Ok(diag) => diag, | ||
| // The commit thread panicked. The fault state survives (it lives | ||
| // behind the handle above), but this batch's outcome is unknown, | ||
| // so it is reported rather than silently folded into the next one. | ||
| Err(join_error) => { | ||
| tracing::error!( | ||
| error = %join_error, | ||
| folded, | ||
| "wallet-event commit thread failed; batch outcome unknown" | ||
| ); | ||
| continue; |
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🔴 Blocking: Continuing after a commit panic can advance the watermark past lost rows
commit_batch consumes the folded batch and calls store() for each wallet. If store() panics before its outcome is known, unwinding bypasses the Err arm that calls fault_wallet, drops the remainder of the consumed batch, and returns a JoinError. This branch then continues with an unaffected fault state, so a later event for the same wallet can successfully persist a higher synced_height even though rows from the panicked batch may be absent. That violates the adapter's fail-closed invariant; before this PR, the panic terminated the adapter and prevented later watermark advancement. Stop the adapter and latch sync_fault, or capture every batch wallet ID before moving the batch and fault all of them before continuing.
| let diag = match committed { | |
| Ok(diag) => diag, | |
| // The commit thread panicked. The fault state survives (it lives | |
| // behind the handle above), but this batch's outcome is unknown, | |
| // so it is reported rather than silently folded into the next one. | |
| Err(join_error) => { | |
| tracing::error!( | |
| error = %join_error, | |
| folded, | |
| "wallet-event commit thread failed; batch outcome unknown" | |
| ); | |
| continue; | |
| Err(join_error) => { | |
| tracing::error!( | |
| error = %join_error, | |
| folded, | |
| "wallet-event commit thread failed; stopping adapter because batch outcome is unknown" | |
| ); | |
| sync_fault.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed); | |
| break; | |
| } |
source: ['codex']
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Fixed in 0499b9c9 — and you are right that this PR introduced the hole rather than merely failing to close it.
Before the move, a panic inside store() unwound the adapter task itself. Violent, but safe in one specific way: the writer was gone, so nothing could persist a higher synced_height afterwards. spawn_blocking converts the same panic into a recoverable JoinError, and my branch logged it and continued with the fault state untouched — so the next batch could advance the watermark past rows whose fate is unknown. Exactly what #4069 closed.
The batch's wallet ids are now captured before the batch moves into the closure, and a JoinError faults every one of them.
On stopping the adapter versus faulting per wallet — I took the per-wallet route rather than the break you suggested. Reasoning, and I am happy to be overruled: a rejected store() already freezes only the wallet it affected and lets its siblings keep syncing, and stopping the adapter would freeze every wallet on the manager over one wallet's bad batch. It would also undo the reason the commit moved off the runtime — one bad batch would again take down the writer for the whole session, just via a different mechanism. sync_fault is latched either way, so the host still sees the hard fault. If you would rather have the harder guarantee, say so and I will switch it to break.
The test covers all three halves of the contract: the hard-fault signal is raised, the adapter survives, and no later store for that wallet carries a synced_height.
On the second point — the off-runtime boundary having no regression coverage — this is a partial answer, not a complete one. ProbePersister gained a panic_next mode, which covers the panicking-store half you asked for. What it does not yet cover is the blocking half: a controllably-blocking persister on a single-worker runtime, asserting another future makes progress while store() is held. That is the test that would actually fail if someone moved commit_batch back inline, and it is worth having. I would rather add it as a follow-up than bolt a timing-sensitive fixture on at the end of this PR — but if you want it here before merge, I will write it.
One note on the test's shape, since it looks over-engineered otherwise: the wait for sync_fault is bounded by an explicit timeout. My first version spun unbounded, which meant a regression hung CI instead of failing it. With the fault path removed the test now fails in 5s with "a panicked commit must raise the hard-fault signal" — verified by actually removing it.
cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib # 663 passed
cargo clippy --all-targets + cargo fmt --check # clean
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Resolved in 0499b9c — Continuing after a commit panic can advance the watermark past lost rows no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
| let committed = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || { | ||
| // The lock is uncontended by construction — this task is the only | ||
| // writer, and one drain commits at a time — so it never blocks; | ||
| // it exists to carry the state, not to arbitrate. | ||
| let mut fault = fault_for_commit | ||
| .lock() | ||
| .unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner()); | ||
| let mut freeze_logged = freeze_for_commit.load(Ordering::Relaxed); | ||
| let diag = commit_batch( | ||
| &*persister_for_commit, | ||
| batch, | ||
| folded, | ||
| &mut fault, | ||
| &sync_fault_for_commit, | ||
| &mut freeze_logged, | ||
| ); | ||
| freeze_for_commit.store(freeze_logged, Ordering::Relaxed); | ||
| diag | ||
| }) | ||
| .await; |
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🟡 Suggestion: The off-runtime persistence boundary has no regression test
The existing ProbePersister returns immediately and checks only persistence outcomes. Those tests still pass if commit_batch is moved back inline onto the Tokio worker, so they do not protect the primary behavior introduced by this PR. Add a controllably blocking persister and run the adapter on a current-thread or single-worker runtime, then verify that another future makes progress while store() remains blocked. The fixture should also cover a panicking store and assert that no later store for the affected wallet carries synced_height.
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in 0499b9c — The off-runtime persistence boundary has no regression test no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
… panics Moving the commit to `spawn_blocking` quietly weakened the fail-closed rule, and both reviewers caught it. Before the move, a panic inside `store()` unwound the adapter task itself. That was violent, but it was safe in one specific way: the writer was gone, so no later batch could persist a higher `synced_height` for a wallet whose rows had just been lost. `spawn_blocking` turns the same panic into a recoverable `JoinError`, and the branch I wrote logged it and carried on — leaving the fault state untouched, so the very next batch could advance the watermark past rows of unknown fate. That is exactly the hole #4069 closed. The wallet ids are now captured before the batch moves into the closure, and a `JoinError` faults every one of them. Per-wallet rather than stopping the adapter, matching what a rejected `store()` already does: a wallet whose commit is in doubt freezes, its siblings keep syncing, and the process stays alive — which is the point of moving the commit off the runtime in the first place. `ProbePersister` gained a `panic_next` mode, and the new test asserts all three halves of the contract: the hard-fault signal is raised, the adapter survives, and no later store for that wallet carries a `synced_height`. The wait for the signal is bounded. An unbounded spin would have wedged CI with no diagnosis on a regression rather than failing it — verified by removing the fault path, where the test now fails in 5s with "a panicked commit must raise the hard-fault signal" instead of hanging. cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib # 663 passed cargo clippy --all-targets + cargo fmt --check # clean
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Inline comments:
In `@packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs`:
- Around line 433-435: Update the commit panic handling around commit_batch and
the batch fault loop so only the panicking wallet and wallets whose store calls
did not complete are faulted; preserve successful wallets’ synced_height
updates. Track per-wallet store completion outside the blocking task or isolate
panic handling per wallet, and extend the relevant test to cover a successful
wallet followed by a panicking wallet in one batch.
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
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packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## v4.2-dev #4370 +/- ##
============================================
- Coverage 87.80% 83.64% -4.16%
============================================
Files 2641 2683 +42
Lines 336510 359291 +22781
============================================
+ Hits 295467 300539 +5072
- Misses 41043 58752 +17709
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Final validation — Codex/Sol only (Phase 2 disabled)
The current head correctly restores the fail-closed watermark invariant after a commit-thread panic, so the prior blocking issue is fixed. Two non-blocking gaps remain: the primary off-runtime behavior lacks a direct progress regression test, and panic recovery unnecessarily freezes wallets whose stores already completed successfully.
Source: reviewer backend model gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend model gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated zero-blocker Codex/Sol precheck evidence was promoted to final because Phase 2 (Sonnet/Opus) is temporarily disabled. This is Codex/Sol-only final validation, not Codex + Sonnet/Opus coverage.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet/Opus: not run (Phase 2 disabled — temporary Codex/Sol-only final)
- Secondary pass: disabled (
temporary_phase2_sonnet_disable)
🟡 1 suggestion(s)
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs:433-435: Do not freeze wallets whose stores completed before the panic
`commit_batch` processes the `BTreeMap` serially, but the `JoinError` branch faults every wallet in the drain. If wallet A's `store()` returns `Ok` and wallet B's later store panics, A's outcome is already known and its rows were accepted, yet A is marked faulted and all of its later `synced_height` updates are stripped for the rest of the manager session. Track completed wallet IDs across the blocking boundary, or isolate panic handling per wallet, so recovery faults only the panicking wallet and wallets that were not attempted after it. Add a multi-wallet test with a successful wallet ordered before the panicking wallet.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs:392-411: The off-runtime persistence boundary has no regression test
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4370#discussion_r3758900980)
The new panic test verifies panic isolation and fail-closed recovery, but every non-panicking `ProbePersister::store()` still returns immediately. It therefore does not directly enforce the PR's primary guarantee that a slow synchronous store cannot park the Tokio worker; an inline implementation with equivalent panic isolation would still pass. Add a controllably blocking persister and use a current-thread or single-worker runtime with an external watchdog/release mechanism, then assert that an unrelated future makes progress before the store is released.
| for wallet_id in &batch_wallet_ids { | ||
| fault.fault_wallet(*wallet_id, &sync_fault); | ||
| } |
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🟡 Suggestion: Do not freeze wallets whose stores completed before the panic
commit_batch processes the BTreeMap serially, but the JoinError branch faults every wallet in the drain. If wallet A's store() returns Ok and wallet B's later store panics, A's outcome is already known and its rows were accepted, yet A is marked faulted and all of its later synced_height updates are stripped for the rest of the manager session. Track completed wallet IDs across the blocking boundary, or isolate panic handling per wallet, so recovery faults only the panicking wallet and wallets that were not attempted after it. Add a multi-wallet test with a successful wallet ordered before the panicking wallet.
source: ['coderabbit']
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Resolved in 4e5a193 — Do not freeze wallets whose stores completed before the panic no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
…unknown Two review findings, and the first is a correction to my own fix. **The panic handler over-corrected.** `commit_batch` walks the batch serially, so a panic partitions it: wallets whose `store()` already returned are settled — accepted or rejected, and a rejection faulted them from inside. Faulting those too stripped a healthy wallet's watermark for the rest of the session over a sibling's bad batch. `commit_batch` now records each wallet as its `store()` RETURNS — after the call, so a panicking wallet never reaches the line, and a wallet the loop never got to is never recorded. What is missing from that list is exactly the set whose outcome nobody can reason about, and only those freeze. The list lives behind an `Arc<Mutex<..>>` outside the closure so it survives the panic that makes it interesting. **The off-runtime boundary now has a test that actually guards it.** Every other test here passes with `commit_batch` moved back inline, because they only assert persistence outcomes. `a_blocked_store_does_not_ park_the_runtime` runs the adapter on a single worker, parks a `store()` with a controllable gate, and requires a spawned task to still be scheduled. It is built out of `std::mpsc::recv_timeout` and `std::thread::sleep` rather than `tokio::time`, and that is not stylistic: the regression parks the runtime's only worker, and a tokio timer needs that runtime to fire. My first two attempts used async timeouts and HUNG on the regression instead of failing it, which is worse than the bug — CI burns the wall clock and reports nothing. Verified by reverting to an inline commit: the test now fails in 5s with "a blocked store must not hold the runtime's only worker: Timeout". The cross-wallet test is likewise bounded, for the same reason: a frozen wallet's watermark-only changeset collapses to nothing, so an unbounded `recv` waits forever on a regression. cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib # 665 passed cargo clippy --all-targets + cargo fmt --check # clean
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Final validation — Codex/Sol only (Phase 2 disabled)
The main off-runtime persistence change is sound, and the current head fixes both previously verified gaps with direct regression coverage and per-wallet completion tracking. Two non-blocking panic-recovery issues remain: projected no-op wallets can be frozen despite having nothing to persist, and panic-induced freezes bypass the documented one-shot logcat fault marker.
Source: reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated zero-blocker Codex/Sol precheck evidence was promoted to final because Phase 2 (Sonnet/Opus) is temporarily disabled. This is Codex/Sol-only final validation, not Codex + Sonnet/Opus coverage.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet/Opus: not run (Phase 2 disabled — temporary Codex/Sol-only final)
- Secondary pass: disabled (
temporary_phase2_sonnet_disable)
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs:384-392: Exclude no-op wallets from panic faulting
`batch_wallet_ids` includes every wallet that contributed an event, even when its projected `WalletBatch` is empty and `commit_batch` consequently skips `store()` at lines 555-559. This occurs, for example, when `TransactionInstantLocked` is intentionally ignored because the transaction is already chain-locked. If another wallet's store panics, an empty wallet does not appear in `settled`, regardless of whether it was skipped before the panic or ordered after it, so the panic handler freezes that healthy wallet's watermark for the remainder of the session even though it had no rows to persist. Build the panic-recovery candidate list from batches that contain persistable changes.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs:462-478: Emit the one-shot fault marker for panic-induced freezes
The panic branch calls `fault_wallet`, which raises the host-visible hard-fault latch, but reports the freeze only through `tracing::error!` and never updates `freeze_logged`. This contradicts the adapter's documented observability contract at lines 282-286: `SYNC WATERMARK FROZEN` deliberately uses the `log` facade because `tracing` may not reach Android logcat. A commit panic can therefore freeze watermarks without the operational marker, and a later rejected store can emit that supposedly one-shot marker as though it were the first fault. Route rejection and panic recovery through a shared atomic one-shot logging helper so the latch is updated immediately, including when a later store in the same blocking task panics.
| // Captured before the batch moves into the closure: if the commit | ||
| // thread panics, these are the wallets whose rows have an unknown fate | ||
| // and whose watermark must therefore be frozen. | ||
| let batch_wallet_ids: Vec<WalletId> = batch.keys().copied().collect(); | ||
| // Filled by `commit_batch` as each wallet's `store()` returns. Lives | ||
| // out here so a panicking commit thread cannot take it down with it: | ||
| // what it holds is the difference between "this wallet's rows are | ||
| // accounted for" and "nobody knows". | ||
| let settled: Arc<Mutex<Vec<WalletId>>> = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())); |
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🟡 Suggestion: Exclude no-op wallets from panic faulting
batch_wallet_ids includes every wallet that contributed an event, even when its projected WalletBatch is empty and commit_batch consequently skips store() at lines 555-559. This occurs, for example, when TransactionInstantLocked is intentionally ignored because the transaction is already chain-locked. If another wallet's store panics, an empty wallet does not appear in settled, regardless of whether it was skipped before the panic or ordered after it, so the panic handler freezes that healthy wallet's watermark for the remainder of the session even though it had no rows to persist. Build the panic-recovery candidate list from batches that contain persistable changes.
| // Captured before the batch moves into the closure: if the commit | |
| // thread panics, these are the wallets whose rows have an unknown fate | |
| // and whose watermark must therefore be frozen. | |
| let batch_wallet_ids: Vec<WalletId> = batch.keys().copied().collect(); | |
| // Filled by `commit_batch` as each wallet's `store()` returns. Lives | |
| // out here so a panicking commit thread cannot take it down with it: | |
| // what it holds is the difference between "this wallet's rows are | |
| // accounted for" and "nobody knows". | |
| let settled: Arc<Mutex<Vec<WalletId>>> = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())); | |
| let batch_wallet_ids: Vec<WalletId> = batch | |
| .iter() | |
| .filter_map(|(wallet_id, wallet_batch)| { | |
| (!wallet_batch.core.is_empty_no_records() | |
| || !Merge::is_empty(&wallet_batch.asset_locks)) | |
| .then_some(*wallet_id) | |
| }) | |
| .collect(); |
source: ['codex']
| { | ||
| let mut fault = fault | ||
| .lock() | ||
| .unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner()); | ||
| for wallet_id in &unsettled { | ||
| fault.fault_wallet(*wallet_id, &sync_fault); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| tracing::error!( | ||
| error = %join_error, | ||
| folded, | ||
| settled = settled_ids.len(), | ||
| frozen = unsettled.len(), | ||
| "wallet-event commit thread failed; freezing the wallets whose \ | ||
| rows have an unknown outcome" | ||
| ); | ||
| continue; |
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🟡 Suggestion: Emit the one-shot fault marker for panic-induced freezes
The panic branch calls fault_wallet, which raises the host-visible hard-fault latch, but reports the freeze only through tracing::error! and never updates freeze_logged. This contradicts the adapter's documented observability contract at lines 282-286: SYNC WATERMARK FROZEN deliberately uses the log facade because tracing may not reach Android logcat. A commit panic can therefore freeze watermarks without the operational marker, and a later rejected store can emit that supposedly one-shot marker as though it were the first fault. Route rejection and panic recovery through a shared atomic one-shot logging helper so the latch is updated immediately, including when a later store in the same blocking task panics.
source: ['codex']
3 participants
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
run_wallet_event_adaptercalledcommit_batch— and through itpersister.store()— inline on the tokio worker driving it.store()is synchronous and, for the SQLite backend, commits a real transaction per call. Its own trait docs (traits.rs:200-206, 263-267) already warn that a slow write blocks every other wallet accessor for its duration; what they do not say, because until now it was not true, is that it also blocks the runtime those accessors run on.Found while investigating a user report that a restored wallet's transaction history appears only in large, minutes-apart jumps long after Core sync reports 100%.
Evidence from a testnet restore of a 6663-transaction wallet (52k-line session log):
folded1 → 47 → 164 → 512 (theADAPTER_STORE_BATCH_LIMITceiling), with gaps of 42s, 144s and finally 1109s between them.Blocks: … last_activity: 549sat the same moment — the SPV managers sharing that runtime were starved, not idle.The escalating
foldedcounts are the symptom, not the cause: events pile up in the channel because the previous drain's synchronousstore()is still holding a worker.What was done?
commit_batchnow runs ontokio::task::spawn_blocking.The handle is awaited rather than raced against
cancel. A store that has started must be allowed to finish, and dropping aspawn_blockinghandle does not stop the thread in any case. Shutdown is observed at the nextrecv, which is where the loop already handles it.AdapterFaultStateand the freeze latch move behindArc<Mutex<..>>/Arc<AtomicBool>instead of being moved into the closure by value. This is the part worth reviewing: moving them would mean a panicking commit thread loses a wallet's frozen watermark — un-freezing a wallet whose verification had failed, which is the single outcome the fail-closed guard exists to prevent. The lock is uncontended by construction (this task is the only writer, and one drain commits at a time), so it carries state rather than arbitrating access.A panicking commit thread is now reported and its drain skipped, rather than taking the adapter down with it.
Not done here
Nothing about batch sizing, the channel, or
ADAPTER_STORE_BATCH_LIMIT. With the blocking call off the runtime the coalescing behaves as designed; tuning it before re-measuring would be guessing.How Has This Been Tested?
Not covered: no test reproduces the stall. Doing so needs a persister whose
store()blocks for a controllable duration plus assertions on runtime poll latency — worth adding, but it would not have caught this class of bug by construction, only this instance of it. The change is behaviour-preserving for the commit itself: the samecommit_batch, the same inputs, the same diagnostics line.A before/after restore on device is the measurement that matters, and I have the "before" trace above to compare against.
Breaking Changes
None. No public API changes;
PlatformWalletPersistenceimplementors are unaffected (the trait already requiresSend + Sync).Checklist:
For repository code-owners and collaborators only
Summary by CodeRabbit