docs(handover): the autonomous run is done — nine tasks, four questions - #44
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docs(handover): the autonomous run is done — nine tasks, four questions#44codeitlikemiley wants to merge 1 commit into
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§2 moves to `4e1ce9c` and 109/101/8, recounted programmatically. M14.9 arrived from another session mid-run. §3 records the one thing blocking the rest — M14.8's decision, which tasks 2 and 3 have already mostly made — and names a pattern the run found three times: a protocol or manifest field that reads like a control and controls nothing. `NetPolicy::allow` granted every host when asked for one. `plugin.toml`'s `net:` was rendered at the consent prompt and reached no sandbox. `CallMeta.task` is promised by docs/12 and read by nobody. Each was individually latent; together they say the policy layer has been written ahead of the enforcement layer more than once, and nothing catches that class automatically. A lint that fails when a policy field has no reader would have caught all three. §6 is rewritten around what is actually left: four questions, then the dogfood, then the hardware-blocked list. The training *gates* are executable now (#40), so a model can be judged the day one exists — which is the point of shipping gates and not scores. Also recorded: the two known flakes with what triggers them, and what this machine does to the suite when another project builds alongside it — gates ran 60 minutes to 3.5 hours against a usual 15, and a parent process at 0% CPU is not evidence of a stall. `RUN-REPORT.md` is the full log: every task, every bug found outside the list, every test deliberately broken to prove it fails, the mistakes I made, the deviations I took and why, and what remains unverified. #39 is superseded by it. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017kFpYDqvz6sKGSkM4YKaRf
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Closes the run brief in
GOAL.prompt.md. All nine tasks shipped or resolved.109 milestones, 101 shipped, 8 open, recounted programmatically.Four questions waiting for you
All four are at the top of
RUN-REPORT.md, each phrased to be answerable in a word:CallMeta.task— honour it, or remove the field and docs/12's promise?The finding I'd most want you to see
Three fields, found one per task, only visible as a class in hindsight — each reads like a control and controls nothing:
NetPolicy::allowplugin.tomlnet:SandboxPolicyCallMeta.taskEach was individually latent. Together they say the policy layer has been written ahead of the enforcement layer more than once. A lint that fails when a policy field has no reader would have caught all three — that's the durable fix, and it isn't written.
And one thing that was reported and isn't true
A scoping agent claimed
nscurl -bgescapes the macOS sandbox viamach-lookup, with 559 bytes exfiltrated. Tested against the real generated profile: rc=139, no file. The 559 bytes matches my unsandboxed control exactly — its probe wasn't sandboxed. No vulnerability. Recorded so nobody "fixes" it later.Also in the report
Every test I deliberately broke to prove it fails (seven, all restored green), the mistakes I made during the run — a
git reset --softthat folded the report into a milestone commit, a CI red on Linux-only dead code, a test of mine that raced a deliberate design — the two deviations I took from the brief and why, and what remains unverified.Plus, practically: this machine stretched gates from ~15 minutes to 60–210 because another project built alongside and UTM/QEMU held ~127% of a core for seven hours. Nothing was wrong with the code, and a
cargo test --workspaceparent at 0% CPU is not evidence of a stall.Supersedes #39.
https://claude.ai/code/session_017kFpYDqvz6sKGSkM4YKaRf