Summary
Any Tesla client pipeline that includes Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponse or Tesla.Middleware.Compression eagerly decompresses HTTP response bodies with no size limit. A server under attacker control (or reached via a redirect) can return a tiny gzip-encoded payload that expands into gigabytes of BEAM heap, crashing or freezing the calling process. Stacking multiple content-encoding tokens multiplies the amplification exponentially.
Details
decompress_body/2 in lib/tesla/middleware/compression.ex passes the full response body to :zlib.gunzip/1 or :zlib.unzip/1 with no cap on output size. The list of codec tokens comes from splitting the content-encoding header on commas, and decompress_body/2 recurses once per token. A response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, gzip triggers four recursive decompression passes. Each gzip layer can expand its input roughly 1000x, so a 284-byte wire payload with four layers inflates to approximately 1 GB at the innermost pass, all materialised as a single binary in the caller's heap.
PoC
- Serve an HTTP response with
content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, gzip where the body is a 1 GB block of zeros compressed through four successive gzip passes.
- Send that response to a Tesla client whose pipeline includes
Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponse.
decompress_body/2 recurses four times without any size check, materialising ~1 GB in the calling process's heap.
- Repeated or sufficiently large requests exhaust available memory and crash or freeze the node.
Impact
High severity (CVSS v4.0: 8.2). Any application using tesla 0.6.0 through 1.18.2 with Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponse or Tesla.Middleware.Compression in its pipeline is vulnerable. The attacker only needs to control a server the client contacts, including via redirects. Fixed in tesla 1.18.3.
Configurations
The application must include Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponse or Tesla.Middleware.Compression in its Tesla middleware pipeline.
Resources
References
Summary
Any Tesla client pipeline that includes
Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponseorTesla.Middleware.Compressioneagerly decompresses HTTP response bodies with no size limit. A server under attacker control (or reached via a redirect) can return a tiny gzip-encoded payload that expands into gigabytes of BEAM heap, crashing or freezing the calling process. Stacking multiplecontent-encodingtokens multiplies the amplification exponentially.Details
decompress_body/2inlib/tesla/middleware/compression.expasses the full response body to:zlib.gunzip/1or:zlib.unzip/1with no cap on output size. The list of codec tokens comes from splitting thecontent-encodingheader on commas, anddecompress_body/2recurses once per token. A response advertisingcontent-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, gziptriggers four recursive decompression passes. Each gzip layer can expand its input roughly 1000x, so a 284-byte wire payload with four layers inflates to approximately 1 GB at the innermost pass, all materialised as a single binary in the caller's heap.PoC
content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, gzipwhere the body is a 1 GB block of zeros compressed through four successive gzip passes.Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponse.decompress_body/2recurses four times without any size check, materialising ~1 GB in the calling process's heap.Impact
High severity (CVSS v4.0: 8.2). Any application using
tesla0.6.0 through 1.18.2 withTesla.Middleware.DecompressResponseorTesla.Middleware.Compressionin its pipeline is vulnerable. The attacker only needs to control a server the client contacts, including via redirects. Fixed in tesla 1.18.3.Configurations
The application must include
Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponseorTesla.Middleware.Compressionin its Tesla middleware pipeline.Resources
References