Only the latest release on master is supported.
Use GitHub's private security advisory for this repository (Report a vulnerability → Security tab). Please do not open a public issue for security reports.
Include what you found, how it could be abused, and — if you have it — a minimal reproduction. You should get a first response within a few days.
gitlarp handles GitHub PATs and an operator secret, so the interesting bugs are:
- any path that leaks a PAT: responses, logs, error bodies, URLs, argv, or at-rest storage
- auth bypass on the headless API or the run endpoint
(
POST /api/schedules/run) - weaknesses in the schedule-store encryption
(
GITLARP_SCHEDULE_SECRET) or its rotation - injection into the GitHub API calls, D1 queries, or the filesystem schedule store
- XSS in the web UI or the embedded widget
Hosted deployments are configured by their operators; report issues
that affect any correctly configured deployment of apps/server or
apps/worker.
- GitHub's opinion of backdated commits (see the README's Caveats)
- misconfigured self-hosts: an operator who sets a weak
GITLARP_SCHEDULE_SECRET, disables TLS, or fronts the server with a proxy that breaks the rate limiter's peer-address assumption - the widget being pointed at an attacker-chosen API base — documented behavior: the widget sends the typed PAT to the API base it shows next to the input; embedding third-party widgets is a trust decision
- brute-forcing an operator's weak secret (documented: use
openssl rand -base64 32, the AES key is a plain SHA-256 of the secret)