Linux, modified distributions, and any historical or unsupported code are outside the 1.0.0 security-support boundary.

Do not open a public issue or discussion for a suspected vulnerability.

Use the repository's private GitHub Security Advisory form. Include the affected version and platform, impact, reproduction steps, relevant logs with credentials removed, and whether you believe active exploitation is occurring. If the private form is unavailable, contact the repository owner through GitHub and request a private channel without disclosing technical details publicly.

We aim to acknowledge a complete report within seven days, keep the reporter updated during investigation, and coordinate disclosure after a fix is available. These targets are not a paid bug-bounty commitment.

The supported server is a single-user local application:

• it binds only to loopback;
• it rejects foreign Host headers and cross-origin browser mutations;
• static assets, same-origin login, and minimal liveness health are the only public routes;
• every other /api/* route requires an X-Token session credential;
• query-string credentials are rejected;
• sessions expire after 12 hours; and
• logout revokes the presented session, while a server restart invalidates all sessions.

The application does not provide LAN/public binding, TLS termination, reverse-proxy trust, or multi-user authorization. Operator-managed SSH or WireGuard tunnels terminate outside this security boundary.

Cookie files, native-browser profiles, the Web UI password file, queue and watch state, history, detailed job specifications, and logs can contain sensitive data. Secret-bearing files — including the Web UI password file — are created owner-only from their first byte: on Windows a restrictive DACL naming only the current user, on macOS mode 0600 enforced through the descriptor that created the file. They do not inherit their parent directory's permissions, so they are not exposed to SYSTEM, Administrators, or other local accounts. Cookie replacement and durable state writes use locked, flushed, atomic replacement.

Reading a Chromium browser copies the cookie-bearing parts of its profile into a temporary directory, created owner-only the same way, and deletes it afterwards. On Windows that deletion frequently cannot succeed: Chrome creates subdirectories inside the copy with permissions naming only an internal Chrome identity, leaving the owning user without an entry. The copy is not readable by other accounts, but it does persist, so the application reports where it was left rather than discarding a login that worked.

Cookies remain local except when sent to the authenticated video service selected by the user. Normal logs redact credential-bearing URLs, cookies, webhook secrets, proxy details, and unnecessary absolute paths. Users remain responsible for protecting their operating-system account, backups, exported cookies, browser storage, downloaded media, and explicitly configured webhook or proxy destinations.

Automated installers accept only reviewed immutable manifest entries and verify SHA-256 before probing or executing downloaded bytes. Python environment updates use the packaged hash-locked allowlist. Managed FFmpeg is Windows-only; macOS uses manual or Homebrew FFmpeg. Unreviewed optional providers, external proxies, browser extensions, Homebrew, and user-supplied FFmpeg builds retain their own security and license boundaries.