fix: ledger redaction — preserve write paths and close a curl -u credential leak introduced by #1117 - #1246
fix: ledger redaction — preserve write paths and close a curl -u credential leak introduced by #1117#1246anandgupta42 wants to merge 1 commit into
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…ential leak introduced by #1117 `SessionCompaction.redactLedgerDetail` called `Telemetry.maskString` before its own curl-credential redaction. #1117 added a filesystem-path masking pass to `maskString` that collapses any 2+ segment path — including `/usr/bin/curl` — to the literal `<path>` before the curl-context lookback ran. Two consequences: - Every write path in the ledger collapsed to `<path>`, so the ledger could no longer report which file was written (4 failing tests). - With the `curl` token gone, the curl-context lookback found nothing, so a path-qualified curl invocation's space-separated `-u user password` (non-colon-shaped, so not otherwise flagged as credential-shaped) passed through `redactLedgerDetail` unredacted — a real credential leaking into ledger text that is later persisted into a model prompt across compaction. Fix: - `Telemetry.maskString` gains an opt-out for its path-masking pass (`maskPaths`, default `true`, unchanged for every existing caller). Every other mask (api keys, bearer tokens, emails, internal hosts, quote collapsing) still applies regardless. - `redactLedgerDetail` calls `maskString(value, { maskPaths: false })`, restoring write-path fidelity and, because the `curl` token survives, restoring the curl-context lookback. - Belt-and-suspenders: `redactLedgerDetail`'s curl-context detection is also derived independently from the pre-mask raw value (correlated ordinally against the masked-string matches), so it no longer depends solely on `maskPaths:false` — a future masking rule that happens to eat the command name can't quietly reopen this leak. Adds an explicit adversarial test reproducing the leak (`/usr/bin/curl -u alice hunter2 ...` and the `curl.exe` path-qualified variant); confirmed it fails against pre-fix code via `git stash` and passes after. #1117's own telemetry path-masking is untouched for its other callers (mcp/index.ts, sql-execute.ts, tool.ts, prompt.ts, register.ts, dispatcher.ts, registry.ts, warehouse-add.ts, project-scan.ts) — confirmed via test/telemetry/mask-file-paths.test.ts still green. Fixes broken main: origin/main's TypeScript CI job has been red since ~2026-09-04 07:28Z on these 5 tests, blocking all PRs. The leak itself is main-only — not present in v0.10.0 or any released version. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VqnuBDGkh1ZT65Ti7e6DHZ
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughTelemetry masking now supports disabling path masking for ledger redaction. Session compaction detects path-qualified curl commands and redacts space-separated credentials. A regression test covers POSIX and Windows curl paths. ChangesLedger redaction
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to The change improves path-qualified curl redaction, but quoted Windows executable paths can still expose usernames and passwords in persisted session ledgers. This credential leak should be fixed before merge. Suggested reviewers: Poem
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| const rawCurlByOrdinal = [...value.matchAll(USER_FLAG_RE)].map((m) => | ||
| isCurlContext(shellSegmentBefore(value, m.index + m[1].length)), | ||
| ) |
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When a tool command is large and contains many -u/--user occurrences, this scans the entire unbounded raw value and calls shellSegmentBefore from the beginning for every match, making redaction quadratic in the command length. callDetail passes command inputs here without slicing, so a sufficiently large generated command can stall compaction even though Telemetry.maskString deliberately caps its work at 8 KiB; limit the raw scan to the same retained window or compute shell context in a single pass.
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| const curlContext = | ||
| maskedCurlContext || (ordinalsAligned && (rawCurlByOrdinal[currentOrdinal] ?? false)) |
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When a non-curl command has a quoted argument containing the standalone word curl before a benign -u/--user, the new raw signal treats that quoted text as curl execution and redacts the flag value. For example, docker run --label 'use curl here' -u 1000:1000 alpine now loses the UID:GID that the surrounding logic explicitly preserves; the prior masked-only check did not do this because quoted spans were collapsed first. Derive the raw context with quote-aware tokenization rather than applying isCurlContext to a segment that still contains quoted arguments.
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| // path-qualified `curl -u user password` credential slips through | ||
| // unredacted. Every other telemetry mask (api keys, bearer tokens, | ||
| // emails, internal hosts, quote collapsing) still applies. | ||
| let masked = Telemetry.maskString(value, { maskPaths: false }) |
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When a cleared tool's arguments or first output line contains an unquoted home or client path, disabling path masking here now copies that path into createObservationMask. That mask explicitly replaces the cleared output and is replayed on every later provider request, so values such as /Users/Jane Doe/client-repo/... can survive clearing and be disclosed after a provider switch. Preserve paths only for the ledger write entries that require them rather than disabling the PII path pass in the shared redactor used by observation masks.
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Inline comments:
In `@packages/opencode/src/session/compaction.ts`:
- Line 681: Update the curl executable detection in isCurlContext to allow curl
or curl.exe to be followed by a closing quote before whitespace or
end-of-segment, while preserving existing unquoted and path-boundary matching.
Add a regression test covering a quoted Windows executable path with
credentials.
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packages/opencode/src/altimate/telemetry/index.tspackages/opencode/src/session/compaction.tspackages/opencode/test/session/compaction-ledger.test.ts
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| // Windows invokes curl as `curl.exe`, and either platform may reach it | ||
| // through a path such as /usr/bin/curl or a Windows System32 path. | ||
| // Missing those spellings left the `-u` VALUE unredacted. | ||
| return /(?:^|[\s/\\])curl(?:\.exe)?(?=\s|$)/i.test(segment) |
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🏁 Script executed:
sed -n '630,750p' packages/opencode/src/session/compaction.ts
printf '\n--- helper references ---\n'
rg -n "isCurlContext|shellSegmentBefore|USER_FLAG_RE|redactLedgerDetail" packages/opencode/src/session/compaction.ts packages/opencode/test/session/compaction-ledger.test.ts
printf '\n--- focused tests ---\n'
sed -n '370,510p' packages/opencode/test/session/compaction-ledger.test.tsRepository: AltimateAI/altimate-code
Length of output: 16871
🏁 Script executed:
printf '%s\n' '--- compaction imports and mask contract ---'
sed -n '1,115p' packages/opencode/src/session/compaction.ts
printf '%s\n' '--- telemetry mask implementation references ---'
rg -n "function maskString|maskString|quote|quoted" packages/opencode/src/telemetry packages/opencode/src/altimate/telemetry/index.ts | head -80Repository: AltimateAI/altimate-code
Length of output: 7517
Sensitive Data Exposure (CWE-532): Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
Reachability: External · Exploitability: Moderate
Recognize quoted executable paths in isCurlContext.
With "C:\Program Files\curl.exe" -u alice hunter2 ..., the current pattern rejects the raw segment because curl.exe is followed by ". The redaction callback can retain both credentials in the ledger.
Allow a closing quote before whitespace or end. Add a regression test for this command.
Proposed fix
- return /(?:^|[\s/\\])curl(?:\.exe)?(?=\s|$)/i.test(segment)
+ return /(?:^|[\s/\\])curl(?:\.exe)?(?=["']?(?:\s|$))/i.test(segment)📝 Committable suggestion
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Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| return /(?:^|[\s/\\])curl(?:\.exe)?(?=\s|$)/i.test(segment) | |
| return /(?:^|[\s/\\])curl(?:\.exe)?(?=["']?(?:\s|$))/i.test(segment) |
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minimal, and validate.
In `@packages/opencode/src/session/compaction.ts` at line 681, Update the curl
executable detection in isCurlContext to allow curl or curl.exe to be followed
by a closing quote before whitespace or end-of-segment, while preserving
existing unquoted and path-boundary matching. Add a regression test covering a
quoted Windows executable path with credentials.
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Code Review SummaryStatus: No Issues Found | Recommendation: Merge Files Reviewed (3 files)
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2 issues found across 3 files
Prompt for AI agents (unresolved issues)
Check if these issues are valid — if so, understand the root cause of each and fix them. If appropriate, use sub-agents to investigate and fix each issue separately.
<file name="packages/opencode/src/session/compaction.ts">
<violation number="1" location="packages/opencode/src/session/compaction.ts:681">
P1: Valid shell invocations such as `"/usr/bin/curl" -u alice hunter2` and `$(curl -u alice hunter2)` are not recognized as curl here. `shellSegmentBefore` leaves a quote or `(` immediately before `curl`, so this check returns false and the two-token credential remains unredacted; parse the shell command token, including quoted executables and subshell/grouping forms, before deciding whether to redact `-u`.</violation>
</file>
<file name="packages/opencode/test/session/compaction-ledger.test.ts">
<violation number="1" location="packages/opencode/test/session/compaction-ledger.test.ts:456">
P2: This regression test only asserts the credential is redacted, so it never locks in the PR's other stated goal: preserving the write-path (`/usr/bin/curl` must not collapse to `<path>`). The raw-value curl-context fallback in redactLedgerDetail redacts the `-u alice hunter2` credential even if a future masking change eats the command token, so this test would stay green while path fidelity silently breaks. Assert the path survives, e.g. `expect(detail).toContain("/usr/bin/curl")` / `toContain("/usr/local/bin/curl.exe")` per command, and optionally `not.toContain("<path>")`.</violation>
</file>
Reply with feedback, questions, or to request a fix.
Re-trigger cubic
| // Windows invokes curl as `curl.exe`, and either platform may reach it | ||
| // through a path such as /usr/bin/curl or a Windows System32 path. | ||
| // Missing those spellings left the `-u` VALUE unredacted. | ||
| return /(?:^|[\s/\\])curl(?:\.exe)?(?=\s|$)/i.test(segment) |
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P1: Valid shell invocations such as "/usr/bin/curl" -u alice hunter2 and $(curl -u alice hunter2) are not recognized as curl here. shellSegmentBefore leaves a quote or ( immediately before curl, so this check returns false and the two-token credential remains unredacted; parse the shell command token, including quoted executables and subshell/grouping forms, before deciding whether to redact -u.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At packages/opencode/src/session/compaction.ts, line 681:
<comment>Valid shell invocations such as `"/usr/bin/curl" -u alice hunter2` and `$(curl -u alice hunter2)` are not recognized as curl here. `shellSegmentBefore` leaves a quote or `(` immediately before `curl`, so this check returns false and the two-token credential remains unredacted; parse the shell command token, including quoted executables and subshell/grouping forms, before deciding whether to redact `-u`.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -667,17 +667,57 @@ export namespace SessionCompaction {
+ // Windows invokes curl as `curl.exe`, and either platform may reach it
+ // through a path such as /usr/bin/curl or a Windows System32 path.
+ // Missing those spellings left the `-u` VALUE unredacted.
+ return /(?:^|[\s/\\])curl(?:\.exe)?(?=\s|$)/i.test(segment)
+ }
+
</file context>
| expect(detail).not.toContain("alice") | ||
| expect(detail).not.toContain("hunter2") | ||
| } |
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P2: This regression test only asserts the credential is redacted, so it never locks in the PR's other stated goal: preserving the write-path (/usr/bin/curl must not collapse to <path>). The raw-value curl-context fallback in redactLedgerDetail redacts the -u alice hunter2 credential even if a future masking change eats the command token, so this test would stay green while path fidelity silently breaks. Assert the path survives, e.g. expect(detail).toContain("/usr/bin/curl") / toContain("/usr/local/bin/curl.exe") per command, and optionally not.toContain("<path>").
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At packages/opencode/test/session/compaction-ledger.test.ts, line 456:
<comment>This regression test only asserts the credential is redacted, so it never locks in the PR's other stated goal: preserving the write-path (`/usr/bin/curl` must not collapse to `<path>`). The raw-value curl-context fallback in redactLedgerDetail redacts the `-u alice hunter2` credential even if a future masking change eats the command token, so this test would stay green while path fidelity silently breaks. Assert the path survives, e.g. `expect(detail).toContain("/usr/bin/curl")` / `toContain("/usr/local/bin/curl.exe")` per command, and optionally `not.toContain("<path>")`.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -439,6 +439,25 @@ describe("SessionCompaction.renderLedger", () => {
+ "/usr/local/bin/curl.exe -u alice hunter2 https://example.com",
+ ]) {
+ const detail = SessionCompaction.redactLedgerDetail(command)
+ expect(detail).not.toContain("alice")
+ expect(detail).not.toContain("hunter2")
+ }
</file context>
| expect(detail).not.toContain("alice") | |
| expect(detail).not.toContain("hunter2") | |
| } | |
| expect(detail).toContain(command.split(" ")[0]) | |
| expect(detail).not.toContain("<path>") | |
| expect(detail).not.toContain("alice") | |
| expect(detail).not.toContain("hunter2") |
1 participant
Issue for this PR
Closes #1245
Type of change
What does this PR do?
Security-relevant / expedited — please review promptly.
origin/main'sTypeScriptCI job has been red since ~2026-09-04 07:28Z, blocking all PRs. This fixes both the broken-main failure and a live credential-leak regression it's coupled to.Root cause: #1117 (
14ba9bb9e7) added a filesystem-path masking rule toTelemetry.maskString(packages/opencode/src/altimate/telemetry/index.ts).SessionCompaction.redactLedgerDetail(packages/opencode/src/session/compaction.ts) callsTelemetry.maskString(value)before running its own-u/--usercurl-credential redaction. That ordering has two consequences:<path>, so the session ledger — whose whole purpose is to tell the model which files it already wrote — can no longer report file paths at all./usr/bin/curl -u alice password ...),maskString's path rule replaces thecurl/curl.exetoken with<path>beforeredactLedgerDetail's curl-context lookback ever runs. With thecurltoken gone, the lookback can't find it,curlContextcomes back false, and the space-separated (non-colon-shaped)-u alice passwordidiom isn't otherwise recognized as credential-shaped — so it passes throughredactLedgerDetailcompletely unredacted. This ledger text is persisted into a later model prompt across compaction (see the comment atcompaction.ts:~657): a real credential leaking across a session/provider boundary.The leak is main-only — not present in v0.10.0 or any released version.
Fix:
Telemetry.maskStringgains an opt-out for its path-masking pass:maskString(value, opts?: { maskPaths?: boolean }), defaultmaskPaths: true— byte-for-byte unchanged for every existing caller. WhenmaskPaths: false, only the fix: mask filesystem paths in telemetry error text #1117 path rule is skipped; every other mask (api keys, bearer tokens, emails, internal hosts, quote collapsing) still applies.redactLedgerDetailnow callsmaskString(value, { maskPaths: false }). This restores write-path fidelity (fixes the 4 over-mask tests), and — because thecurltoken survives — the curl-context lookback works again, closing the leak (fixes the 5th test).redactLedgerDetail's curl-context detection is also derived independently from the pre-mask raw value (correlated ordinally against the masked-string matches, with a safe fallback to the prior masked-only check if the two ever disagree). This makes curl detection structurally immune to any future masking rule that happens to eat the command-name token — it no longer depends solely onmaskPaths: false.maskStringcall site was touched — they all keepmaskPaths: true(mcp/index.ts,sql-execute.ts,tool.ts,prompt.ts,register.ts,dispatcher.ts,registry.ts,warehouse-add.ts,project-scan.ts). fix: mask filesystem paths in telemetry error text #1117's telemetry path-masking protection is fully intact for its intended consumers — verified bytest/telemetry/mask-file-paths.test.tsstaying green.Both
telemetry/index.tsandcompaction.tsare upstream-shared files; edits are wrapped inaltimate_changemarkers. The marker guard (bun run script/upstream/analyze.ts --markers --base origin/main --strict) reports clean.Related: this touches the same session-state-ledger security work referenced in
compaction.ts(redactLedgerDetail's existing credential-redaction suite).How did you verify your code works?
bun test packages/opencode/test/session/compaction-ledger.test.ts packages/opencode/test/session/compaction-ledger-history.test.ts— 54 pass, 0 fail (was 5 failing on main).redactLedgerDetail("/usr/bin/curl -u alice hunter2 https://example.com")and a/usr/local/bin/curl.exevariant, asserting the output contains neitheralicenorhunter2. Confirmed it fails against pre-fix code viagit stashon the two source files (leaving the new test in place) — reproduced the leak verbatim (<path> -u alice hunter2 https://example.com/) — then confirmed it passes aftergit stash pop.bun test test/telemetry/mask-file-paths.test.ts test/altimate/telemetry-signals.test.ts test/mcp/mcp-bearer-auth.test.ts— 211 pass, 0 fail (confirms fix: mask filesystem paths in telemetry error text #1117's default-maskPathspath masking is untouched for its other callers).bun testacross alltest/session/compaction-*.test.ts,observation-mask,task-pin,uncounted-tail— 241 pass, 0 fail, 0 regressions.bun run typecheck— clean across all 15 workspace packages.bun run script/upstream/analyze.ts --markers --base origin/main --strict— clean.TypeScriptCI job goes green on the pushed commit.Not independently re-verified: the pre-existing flaky timeouts in
test/session/prompt.test.ts(loop calls LLM and returns assistant message,loop surfaces content-filter finishes as session errors) — confirmed these fail identically against unmodifiedorigin/main(network/mock-provider timeout issue, unrelated to this change) and are not part of this PR's scope.Screenshots / recordings
N/A — no UI change.
Checklist
This PR should NOT be merged by an automated agent — human review requested given the security sensitivity.
Note
High Risk
Changes credential redaction on compaction ledger text that is persisted into later model prompts; the fix is targeted but security-critical.
Overview
Fixes a credential leak and ledger over-masking caused by running filesystem path masking on session-ledger text before compaction-specific redaction.
Telemetry.maskStringnow accepts optional{ maskPaths?: boolean }(default true), so only the #1117 path pass can be skipped; API keys, bearer tokens, emails, and other rules are unchanged for existing callers.redactLedgerDetailcallsmaskString(value, { maskPaths: false })so write paths stay visible in the state ledger and path-qualified commands like/usr/bin/curlare not collapsed to<path>before curl-context detection.Hardening:
-u/--userhandling uses a sharedUSER_FLAG_RE, and curl context is inferred from both the masked string and the raw pre-mask value (ordinal-aligned), so a future mask rule that stripscurlis less likely to reopen the leak.Adds a regression test for path-qualified
curlwith space-separated-u user password.Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 3463f09. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.
Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
curlcommands, including space-separated username and password formats.Tests
curlcommands.Summary by cubic
Fixes a credential leak and broken write-path reporting in the session ledger that #1117 introduced.
Telemetry.maskString's new path-masking pass collapsed/usr/bin/curlto<path>beforeredactLedgerDetail's curl-context lookback ran, so path-qualifiedcurl -u user passwordleaked unredacted into ledger text persisted across compaction; write paths also collapsed to<path>, breaking the ledger's file-reporting purpose. The leak is main-only, not in any release, and the change fixes the five tests that have been red onorigin/main's TypeScript CI since ~2026-09-04 07:28Z.Bug Fixes
Telemetry.maskStringgains amaskPathsopt-out (defaulttrue, byte-for-byte unchanged for all existing callers); only the path pass is skipped, all other masks still apply.redactLedgerDetailnow callsmaskString(value, { maskPaths: false }), restoring write-path fidelity and the curl-context lookback.curlandcurl.exewith space-separated-u user password, confirmed failing against pre-fix code.Written for commit 3463f09. Summary will update on new commits.