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feat(sdk): f.human to forms (slack:#channel, slack:@user, github:@user, approver) — reported as humanWait.recipient, required by flowRequirements - #472
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…, approver — reported as humanWait.recipient and required by flowRequirements
`to` is the delivery contract Cloud acts on. parseHumanRecipient reads
the four documented forms; the parked report and `flows answer` carry
`humanWait.recipient = { provider, kind, target }` beside the raw string
(#3789's parser keeps working). flowRequirements reads a literal `to`
from each f.human call and requires its provider as `slack (f.human to)`
/ `github (f.human to)`, so flows check prints it and flows deploy / the
wizard require it connected. A bare approver or a computed `to` adds
nothing: Cloud resolves those at park time. SURFACE.md §5 documents the
forms, who may answer, and how (thread reply / ✅ ❌ / @relay yes|no).
Closes #468.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughChangesHuman recipient support
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Feature Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant f.human
participant flowRequirements
participant parseHumanRecipient
participant humanWaitReport
f.human->>flowRequirements: provide literal or computed to
flowRequirements->>parseHumanRecipient: identify recipient provider
parseHumanRecipient->>flowRequirements: return provider or undefined
f.human->>humanWaitReport: provide wait.to
humanWaitReport->>parseHumanRecipient: parse wait.to
parseHumanRecipient->>humanWaitReport: return recipient metadata
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Flows without a Slack or GitHub recipient can be incorrectly blocked by connection requirements, so the scanner boundary should be fixed before merge. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3 | ❌ 2❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)
✅ Passed checks (3 passed)
Full details: Linked Issues checkExplanation Issue Resolution Implement and test the Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 71.43% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 7 functions across 8 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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| const starts = [...body.matchAll(call)]; | ||
| return starts.flatMap((match, index) => { | ||
| const slice = body.slice(match.index! + match[0].length, starts[index + 1]?.index ?? body.length); | ||
| const to = slice.match(/(?:^|[^\w$])to\s*:\s*(['"`])([^'"`]*)\1/u)?.[2]; | ||
| return to === undefined ? [] : [to]; | ||
| }); |
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🔴 Human preflight reads wrong recipients
With to: in question text or f["human"], humanRecipients derives the wrong provider or none. Deployment can skip the delivery integration, leaving the human gate parked without a deliverable ask.
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The requirement scan operates on raw function source. It searches every character after f.human( until the next matching call, without tracking JavaScript strings, comments, nesting, or the call's options object. It also recognizes only dotted access even though the context supports bracket access elsewhere. Consequently, valid source can produce requirements for the wrong provider or omit them entirely, and ensureIntegrationsConnected checks only the resulting list.
Example: await f.human("Send to: 'slack:#ops'", { to: 'github:@khaliq' }) records Slack as the requirement because the question's text matches first. A workspace with Slack but no GitHub passes deployment checks, then the GitHub approval cannot be delivered. await f['human']('Ship?', { to: 'slack:#ops' }) records no Slack requirement.
Recommended fix: Parse the function source with the same TypeScript/JavaScript parser used by the authored loader. Inspect actual f.human and f['human'] call expressions, then read a static string value only from the second argument's to property. Add coverage for strings, template text, comments, nested objects, bracket access, and multiple calls.
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Fixed in 99019e5. The scan is now bounded to the f.human(...) call's own balanced argument list (string/template/comment-aware), then to the second argument's object literal, and reads a plain string to at that object's top level only — a later call's to, a nested note.to, a to: inside the question string, an unrelated { to } in the body, and interpolated templates / identifiers (computed, resolved by Cloud) contribute nothing. Test reads each call's own to only covers each decoy. Cloud's scanner on #3794 already strips comments/strings and bounds to the call; the same cases are asserted there.
| const match = FORM.exec(trimmed); | ||
| if (match === null) { | ||
| return { provider: 'approver', kind: 'user', target: trimmed.replace(/^@/u, '') }; | ||
| } | ||
| const provider = match[1] as 'slack' | 'github'; | ||
| const target = match[2]!.trim(); | ||
| if (provider === 'slack' && target.startsWith('#')) { | ||
| return { provider: 'slack', kind: 'channel', target: target.slice(1) }; | ||
| } | ||
| return { provider, kind: 'user', target: target.replace(/^@/u, '') }; |
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🟡 Malformed recipients become delivery targets
parseHumanRecipient treats slack: as an approver and accepts slack:# with an empty channel target. The run parks with a misclassified or unusable recipient instead of rejecting the declaration.
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The parser's return type has no invalid case, but its regular expression rejects an empty suffix by falling through to the approver branch. Other malformed suffixes still produce empty or structurally invalid targets. The authored runtime currently validates only that the whole to string is non-empty in human, so these values reach a durable wait.
Example: f.human('Ship?', { to: 'slack:#' }) produces { provider: 'slack', kind: 'channel', target: '' }. f.human('Ship?', { to: 'slack:' }) produces { provider: 'approver', kind: 'user', target: 'slack:' }, despite explicitly naming Slack.
Recommended fix: Define validation for each supported form and reject empty or structurally invalid targets before creating the wait. Make parseHumanRecipient expose invalid input explicitly or throw only at a preflight/runtime boundary that converts it into an authored-input refusal. Use the same validator in requirement extraction and park reporting.
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Fixed in 99019e5. parseHumanTo now returns { ok, recipient } | { ok: false, reason }: empty, slack:, slack:#, github:, github:#eng, an unknown provider (email:x), and handles with spaces/quotes are refused with a reason; humanRecipientProvider requires nothing for them; and f.human throws human_to_invalid (f.human to "slack:" names no channel or user) before consuming an ordinal or touching the journal, so a malformed to can never park the run on a question that reaches no one. Documented in SURFACE.md §5; tests in human-to.test.ts (12 malformed forms) and authored-human.test.ts (executor refusal, journal never contacted). Mirrored on cloud #3794.
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Inline comments:
In `@packages/sdk/src/flow-requirements.ts`:
- Around line 197-199: Restrict the to extraction in the current f.human parsing
logic to the call’s actual options object rather than the entire substring
before the next f.human call. Ensure to text in the question or unrelated
expressions is ignored, while valid recipient options remain extracted, and add
a regression test covering this boundary.
After applying the fix, consider running `coderabbit review --agent` for local
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docs/SURFACE.mdpackages/sdk/src/authored-flow-error.tspackages/sdk/src/cli/answer.tspackages/sdk/src/cli/run.tspackages/sdk/src/flow-requirements.tspackages/sdk/src/human-to.tspackages/sdk/src/index.tspackages/sdk/tests/human-live.test.tspackages/sdk/tests/human-to.test.ts
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… malformed to as human_to_invalid
The recipient scanner read the first `to:` after `f.human(` up to the next
f.human, so a later call's recipient, a nested `note.to`, a `to:` in the
question string, or an unrelated `{ to }` in the body could be required.
It now walks the call's own balanced argument list, takes the second
argument's object literal, and reads a plain string `to` at its top level
only (interpolated templates and identifiers are computed, Cloud's to
resolve). parseHumanTo returns a typed result; `slack:`, `github:#x`,
unknown providers, handles with spaces etc. are refused with a reason,
and f.human throws human_to_invalid before consuming an ordinal or
touching the journal instead of parking on an undeliverable question.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Cursor Bugbot has reviewed your changes using default effort and found 1 potential issue.
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Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 99019e5. Configure here.
secondArgumentObject and topLevelStringProperty stepped through comments as code, so a comma or to: in a comment on the call could shift or replace the recipient. All three walkers now share skipCommentOrString. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 participant
What
`f.human(question, { to })` now has a defined delivery contract. `to` is one of four forms, parsed by `parseHumanRecipient` (`packages/sdk/src/human-to.ts`) and reported as `humanWait.recipient = { provider, kind, target }` beside the raw string on the parked report and on `flows answer`:
`flowRequirements` reads a literal `to` from each `f.human` call and requires its provider (`slack (f.human to)` / `github (f.human to)`), so `flows check` prints it and `flows deploy` / the wizard require it connected (#465 / cloud #3788). A bare approver or a computed `to` (`input.approver`) adds nothing — Cloud resolves those at park time against the run's own trigger.
`flows answer` is unchanged. docs/SURFACE.md §5 documents the forms and how the person answers where they were asked (thread reply / ✅ ❌ / `@relay yes|no`).
The Cloud half (delivery on park, answer ingestion from Slack/GitHub, resume) is cloud PR stacked on #3789.
Tests
Closes #468.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Note
Medium Risk
Changes human-gate execution and deploy-time integration detection; malformed
tonow fails fast at runtime, and literalslack:/github:recipients can block deploy until connected.Overview
f.humannow treatstoas a fixed delivery contract:slack:#channel,slack:@user,github:@user, or a bare approver handle. A newhuman-toparser validates at call time and rejects bad values withhuman_to_invalidbefore any ordinal or journal write, so runs cannot park on undeliverable questions.Parked runs and
flows answerstill expose the rawtostring but also addhumanWait.recipient({ provider, kind, target }).flowRequirementsstatically scans eachf.humancall for a literaltoand surfacesslack (f.human to)/github (f.human to)for check/deploy; bare approvers and computedtovalues add no integration requirement.docs/SURFACE.md§5 is updated with the table, answer channels, and deploy/connect expectations.Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 5625927. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.
Summary by cubic
Defines the delivery contract for
f.human(question, { to }). Thetovalue has four fixed forms parsed intohumanWait.recipient, and a literalslack:orgithub:tonow requires that integration at deploy time.slack:#channel,slack:@user,github:@user, or a bare approver name; malformed forms are refused at the call ashuman_to_invalidbefore anything is journaled.parseHumanRecipientreports{ provider, kind, target }next to the raw string on parked runs andflows answer.flows checkprints the required provider asslack (f.human to)/github (f.human to), and deploy requires it connected; the scan reads only each call's own literalto(ignoring strings, comments, and nested objects), so a computedto(likeinput.approver) adds no requirement.docs/SURFACE.mddocuments the forms, who may answer, and how.Closes #468.
Written for commit 5625927. Summary will update on new commits.
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claudesessiona4df5178· opened viagh pr create· last active 2026-09-18